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LUKE T. TASHJIAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is widely recognized that the health care system in the 
United States is in crisis.1  The hallmarks of this crisis are a decrease 
in the quality of care, an increase in the cost of care, and a decline 
in access to care.2  A reduction in employer sponsored health care 
coverage has been a root cause of the decline in access to care.3 
* Luke T. Tashjian is an attorney practicing law in Worcester, Massachusetts.  He 
received his J.D. with honors from the University of Connecticut School of Law in 2006. 
He is admitted to practice law in Massachusetts and Connecticut. 
1. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 496 n.15 (D. Md. 
2006), aff’d, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007).  Despite the United States spending sixteen 
percent of its gross domestic product on health care while other industrialized nations 
spend ten percent or less, Brief for AARP as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 6, 
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d 180 (Nos. 06-1840 & 06-1901), the United States 
consistently performs more poorly than most industrialized countries on many mea­
sures of health care quality. NAT’L  COAL. ON  HEALTH  CARE, HEALTH  CARE  FACTS: 
QUALITY OF  CARE (2009), http://nchc.org/sites/default/files/resources/Fact Sheet­
Quality.pdf.  “The U.S. is 33 percent worse than the best country on mortality from 
conditions amendable to health care—that is, deaths that could have been prevented 
with timely and effective care.” NAT’L COAL. ON HEALTH CARE, FACTS ON THE QUAL­
ITY OF HEALTH CARE 1 (2008) (on file with Western New England Law Review) [here­
inafter FACTS ON THE  QUALITY OF  HEALTHCARE].  “Medication-related errors for 
hospitalized patients cost roughly $2 billion annually.” THE  INSTITUTE OF  MEDICINE, 
THE CHASM IN QUALITY: SELECT INDICATORS FROM RECENT REPORTS 1 (2008), http:// 
www.chicagomdjd.com/CM/Articles/The-Chasm-in-Quality-Highlighted.pdf.  “Medical 
errors kill more people per year than breast cancer, AIDS, or motor vehicle accidents.” 
Id.  “The infant mortality rate in the U.S. is 7.0 deaths per 1,000 live births, compared 
with 2.7 in the top three countries.” FACTS ON THE QUALITY OF HEALTHCARE, supra, 
at 1. 
2. Brief for AARP as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, supra note 1, at 3. R 
3. Id. at 6; David Pratt, The Past, Present and Future of Health Care Reform: Can 
it Happen?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 767, 773-74 (2007); see NAT’L COAL. ON HEALTH 
CARE, HEALTH CARE FACTS: COSTS (2009), http://nchc.org/sites/default/files/resources/ 
Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Cost.pdf. 
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The role of this reduction is hard to overstate since most Americans 
receive their coverage through an employer.4 
Politicians and citizens alike have realized that action must be 
taken to stem the decline in employer sponsored health care, but 
there has been a historic inability at the federal level to employ 
effective solutions.5  This inability has led to efforts by the States to 
protect, encourage, and in some cases mandate employer sponsored 
coverage.6  These state efforts have consistently come up against 
and been struck down by a federal statute that, ironically, was in­
tended to promote the provision of employee benefits, the Em­
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 19747 (“ERISA”). 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts undertook one of the 
most recent and sweeping state efforts to reverse the decline in ac­
cess to health care.  This effort is reflected in a bill passed by the 
Massachusetts legislature and signed into law by Governor Romney 
in 2006 (“the Bill”).8  The Bill sought to reverse the decline in ac­
cess to care by mandating that individuals procure minimum credit­
able coverage and that employers make a fair and reasonable 
contribution toward this coverage.9  Due to these mandates, there 
has been wide success in reducing the number of uninsured in 
Massachusetts.10 
Improved access to health care, however, may be short-lived. 
Similar to earlier state-enacted legislation, the Bill is likely to face 
an ERISA preemption challenge, and upon hearing this challenge, 
a court will likely hold that a key provision of the Bill, the employer 
fair share contribution requirement, is preempted. 
Without subjecting the Bill to ERISA preemption, the objec­
tive of the employer fair share contribution requirement, namely 
4. Elise Gould, The Erosion of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance 1 (The Ec­
onomic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper No. 223, 2008), available at http://epi.3cdn.net/ 
d1b4356d96c21c91d1_ilm6b5dua.pdf. 
5. David Simon, Fair Share at Health Care: Current ERISA Preemption Jurispru­
dence Paves the Way for Health Care Reform, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 497, 499 (2007). 
6. Id. at 500. 
7. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461 (2006); Si­
mon, supra note 5, at 501. R 
8. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 
ch. 58, 2006 Mass. Acts 77 (codified in scattered sections of MASS. GEN. LAWS (2008)), 
available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sl060058.htm. 
9. Steve LeBlanc, State Broadens Health Insurance Regs for Firms, WORCESTER 
TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Oct. 2, 2008, at A4 (quoting Sarah Iselin, Commissioner of the 
Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy). 
10. Glen Johnson, State Insurance Law Result Remarkable, WORCESTER  TELE­
GRAM & GAZETTE, Aug. 20, 2008, at A3. 
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that employers be required to contribute to their employees’ cover­
age,11 can still be accomplished if certain changes are made to the 
Bill.  These changes include repealing the fair share contribution 
requirement, increasing the state minimum wage while structuring 
it to resemble a prevailing wage with cash and benefit components, 
restricting employee access to Commonwealth Care policies to em­
ployees who finance their contributions towards these policies with 
direct deposits from their paychecks, and strengthening the individ­
ual mandate by providing that withholdings shall be taken from the 
paychecks of individuals who fail to procure minimum creditable 
coverage. 
I. ERISA PREEMPTION 
A. ERISA Preemption in General 
In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA to encourage the adoption 
of employee benefit plans and to protect the interests of plan par­
ticipants.  It was the belief of Congress that replacement of the dis­
parate state laws governing employee benefit plans with the 
substantive and uniform federal regulatory scheme12 contained in 
ERISA would reduce the administrative burden placed on inter­
state employers, and this reduced burden would, in turn, increase 
the number of employers offering employee benefit plans.13  “To 
this end, ERISA includes expansive pre-emption provisions, . . . 
which are intended to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation 
would be ‘exclusively a federal concern.’”14 
One type of employee benefit plan that falls within the reach 
of ERISA’s preemption provision is an employee welfare benefit 
11. See State House News Service, Daily Transcript, May 4, 2006 (on file with 
Western New England Law Review) (Senator Lees’s response to question regarding 
overriding Governor Mitt Romney’s veto of section 47 of House Bill 4779). 
12. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990).  “Nothing in ER­
ISA requires employers to establish employee benefit plans.  Nor does ERISA mandate 
what kind of benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan.” 
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996). 
13. See Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 142. 
14. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (quoting Alessi v. Ray­
bestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)); see also Anthony Ten Haagan, Sur­
viving Preemption: The Importance of Chapter 58 in the Context of America’s Health 
Care Crisis, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 663, 664 (2007); Wendy K. Mariner, State Regulation of 
Managed Care and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 335 NEW  ENG. J. 
MED. 1986, 1986 (1996). 
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plan.15  An “employee welfare benefit plan” is defined broadly by 
ERISA to include any 
plan, fund, or program which was . . . established or maintained 
by an employer or by an employee organization . . . for the pur­
pose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, 
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, . . . medical, sur­
gical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sick­
ness, accident, [or] disability.16 
Within this definition of an employee welfare benefit plan, a 
“plan” is “a set of rules that define the rights of a beneficiary and 
provide for their enforcement.”17 
While established definitions of “employee welfare benefit 
plan” and “plan” exist, neither ERISA nor its legislative history de­
fine the term “medical benefit,”18 and in the absence of statutory 
guidance, courts have interpreted the term broadly.19  This broad 
judicial interpretation of “medical benefit” results in the vast ma­
jority of health care benefits that an employer extends to its em­
ployees, including employer sponsored health insurance programs, 
qualifying as employee welfare benefit plans.20 
The actual preemption rule, which is subsection (a) of section 
514 of ERISA, provides, “Except as provided in subsection (b) of 
this section [the Savings Clause], the provisions of this subchapter 
. . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .”21  The Sav­
ings Clause states that, “Except as provided in subparagraph (B) 
[the Deemer Clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed 
to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which 
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(3), 1003(a), 1144(a) (2006).  The other type of employee 
benefit plan is an employee pension benefit plan. Id. § 1002(3). 
16. Id. § 1002(1); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir. 
1980), aff’d mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981). 
17. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223 (2000).  “Rules governing collection of 
premiums, definition of benefits, submission of claims, and resolution of disagreements 
over entitlement to services are the sorts of provisions that constitute a plan.” Id. 
18. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 12 F.3d 1498, 1502 (9th Cir. 1993). 
19. See id. at 1503 (holding FAA-mandated medical examinations for pilots are 
considered medical benefits). 
20. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 190 (4th Cir. 2007); 
Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 11 F.3d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding 
that a closely held corporation that subsidized health insurance policies for some of its 
employees had established an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan); Brief for Cham­
ber of Commerce of U.S.A. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee at 15, Retail Indus. 
Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d 180 (No. 06-1840) (citing to 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)). 
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
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regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”22  The Deemer Clause 
restricts the application of the Savings Clause by providing, 
Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established 
under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company 
or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or 
to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for pur­
poses of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance 
companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or 
investment.23 
To summarize the mechanics of these three provisions, the Pre­
emption Clause preempts state laws that relate to employee welfare 
benefit plans, but it does not preempt state laws regulating insur­
ance.  However, states are prohibited from regulating employee 
benefit plans through laws purporting to regulate insurance.24 
B. Test for ERISA Preemption 
With respect to ERISA’s preemption clause, the United States 
Supreme Court has “observed repeatedly that this broadly worded 
provision is clearly expansive.”25  The degree of expansiveness, 
however, is dependent upon the meaning given to the innocuous 
term “relate to” contained in the clause.  As the Supreme Court has 
stated, “the term ‘relate to’ cannot be taken ‘to extend to the fur­
thest stretch of indeterminacy,’ or else ‘for all practical purposes 
pre-emption would never run its course.’”26 
In light of this limitation, the Supreme Court has developed a 
two-part test to determine if a state law “relates to” an employee 
benefit plan.  Under this test, the Court examines if the challenged 
law has either a “connection with” or “reference to” an ERISA 
plan.27  In traditional areas of state regulation, such as health care,28 
courts apply this test in conjunction with a presumption that Con­
gress did not intend to preempt the state law.29 
22. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
23. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
24. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987). 
25. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 146 (2001) (internal quotation marks omit­
ted) (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)). 
26. Id. at 146 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655). 
27. Id. at 147; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990); Shaw 
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). 
28. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976). 
29. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 813-14 
(1997) (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 
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A statute has “reference to” an ERISA plan when the “State’s 
law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans . . . or 
where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s opera­
tion.”30  Under this inquiry, the Court has held preempted state 
laws that imposed requirements by reference to ERISA-covered 
programs,31 that specifically exempted ERISA plans from other­
wise generally applicable garnishment provisions,32 and that estab­
lished causes of action requiring the existence of ERISA plans.33 
Even if a state law does not contain a prohibited “reference to” 
an ERISA plan, the state law will still be preempted by section 
514(a) if it has a “connection with” a covered plan.34  To determine 
if a state law has a prohibited “connection with” a covered plan, a 
court must examine whether it was Congress’s intent for ERISA to 
preempt the type of challenged law by analyzing the nature of the 
effect of the challenged state law on the uniform nationwide admin­
istration of employee benefit plans.35  State laws with only a “tenu­
ous, remote or peripheral” effect on ERISA plans will be upheld.36 
In general, these “are typically ‘laws of general application—often 
traditional exercises of state power or regulatory authority—whose 
effect on ERISA plans is incidental.’”37  In contrast, state laws that 
(1985)); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 494 (D. Md. 2006) 
(quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657), aff’d, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Egel­
hoff, 532 U.S. at 148; Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987). 
30. Rutledge v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 201 F.3d 1212, 1216 
(9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Stan­
dards v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)). 
31. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130-31 
(1992). 
32. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 828 n.2 
(1988). 
33. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1996) (preempting state 
cause of action based on wrongful termination of employee when termination based on 
vesting of ERISA plan benefits). 
34. Id.; see Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983). 
35. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001); Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at 
325-26; Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659. 
36. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661 (quoting Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 
130 n.1).  The indirect effect of a surcharge on hospital expenses for those whose ex­
penses were not paid by Blue Cross & Blue Shield did not bind plan administrators to 
any particular choice and was not preempted. Id. at 664; see also Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 
n.21. 
37. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 12 F.3d 1498, 1504 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
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mandate some element of the structure or administration of ERISA 
plans will be preempted.38 
In determining whether or not a state law is preempted under 
the “connection with” test for effectively mandating some element 
of the structure or administration of a covered plan, a court consid­
ers four factors.39  The first factor examines “whether the state law 
regulates the types of benefits provided by ERISA employee wel­
fare benefit plans.”40  The second factor examines “whether the 
state law requires the establishment of a separate employee benefit 
plan to comply with the law.”41  The third factor examines “whether 
the state law imposes reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting re­
quirements on ERISA plans.”42  The fourth factor examines 
“whether the state law regulates certain ERISA relationships, in­
cluding the relationships between an ERISA plan and an employer 
and, to the extent an employee benefit plan is involved, between an 
employer and employee.”43 
II. THE MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM BILL 
The Massachusetts Health Care Reform Bill44 constitutes the 
second “pay-or-play” statute that was implemented by a state.45 
38. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97; see also Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 
F.3d 180, 192-93 (4th Cir. 2007). 
39. See Rutledge v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 201 F.3d 1212, 
1218 (9th Cir. 2000). 
40. Operating Eng’rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 
F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Aloha Airlines, 12 F.3d at 1504); see also Shaw, 
463 U.S. at 100 (preempting a state law requiring ERISA plans to pay benefits to indi­
viduals unable to work due to pregnancy). 
41. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d at 678 (quoting Aloha Airlines, 12 F.3d at 
1504); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Cyne, 482 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1987) (holding that 
one-time lump sum severance payment does not relate to an ERISA plan since the law 
does not require the establishment or maintenance of a plan). 
42. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d at 678 (quoting Aloha Airlines, 12 F.3d at 
1504); see also Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(holding a state cannot require an employer to provide certain employee welfare bene­
fits through an ERISA plan), aff’d mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981). 
43. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d at 678 (quoting Aloha Airlines, 12 F.3d at 
1504). 
44. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 
ch. 58, 2006 Mass. Acts 77, available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/ 
sl060058.htm. 
45. The first pay-or-play law was the Maryland Fair Share Act, MD. CODE ANN., 
LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-102 (LexisNexis 2008).  This is not including the Hawaii Prepaid 
Healthcare Act because the Hawaii Act was granted an exemption from preemption. 
The Maryland Act was preempted by ERISA in Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v. 
Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of U.S.A. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, supra note 20, at 3 (defining pay-or-play laws). R 
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While this may make it appear that such statutes requiring employ­
ers either to contribute to their employees’ coverage or pay a state 
surcharge are a new concept, the Massachusetts legislature strug­
gled for almost two decades to implement a pay-or-play statute. 
The initial effort to compel Massachusetts employers to con­
tribute to their employees’ coverage resulted in the passage of an 
act in 1988 titled, “An Act to Make Health Security Available to 
All Citizens of the Commonwealth and to Improve Hospital Fund­
ing” (“the 1988 Act”).46  The 1988 Act incorporated a form of a 
pay-or-play statute by requiring businesses employing six or more 
employees to pay a medical security contribution of up to twelve 
percent of their employees’ wages into a state fund, but allowing a 
credit against this contribution equal to the employer’s contribution 
toward its employees’ health care coverage.47  Although this law 
would have accomplished the Bill’s goal of requiring employers to 
contribute to their employees’ coverage, the 1988 Act was amended 
to remove the tax and tax credit features it contained before these 
features were implemented.48 
Similar to the 1988 Act, the Bill mandates that covered em­
ployers make legislatively-determined fair and reasonable contribu­
tions toward their employees’ coverage, but unlike the tax and tax 
credit features of the 1988 Act, the Bill requires covered employers 
to either make the contribution or pay a fixed surcharge.  Also, in 
contrast to the prior legislation, the Bill places a mandate on indi­
viduals to obtain minimum creditable coverage. 
A. The Individual Mandate 
The individual mandate contained in the Bill required all re­
sidents of the Commonwealth who are over eighteen years of age to 
obtain minimum creditable coverage by July 1, 2007.49  To assist in 
the procurement of this coverage, the Bill established both a sliding 
scale under which the cost of premiums for commercial plans is sub­
46. An Act to Make Health Security Available to All Citizens of the Common­
wealth and to Improve Hospital Financing, ch. 23, 1988 Mass. Acts 85, available at 
http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1988/1988Acts0023.pdf. 
47. § 46, 1988 Mass. Acts at 142-43. 
48. An Act Providing for Improved Access to Health Care, ch. 203, § 21, 1996 
Mass. Acts 913, 928-32, available at http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1996/ 
1996acts0203.pdf; see Jared Stiefel, ERISA Preemption of Chapter 58: The Future of the 
“Pay or Play” Model of Health Care Legislation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 683, 691-92 
(2007). 
49. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, §§ 1-2 (2008). 
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sidized based on an individual’s income50 and the Commonwealth 
Health Insurance Connector (“the Commonwealth Connector”).51 
The Commonwealth Connector assists individuals in obtaining cov­
erage by enabling them to purchase insurance through a larger risk 
pool, analyzing the benefits provided by the plans it offers, and ne­
gotiating with insurers for competitive rates.52 
An individual’s coverage can either be deemed per se to consti­
tute minimum creditable coverage53 or it can be determined to con­
stitute minimum creditable coverage by complying with the 
regulations promulgated by the Commonwealth Connector.54  As 
of January 1, 2009, these regulations require the provision of a 
broad range of care and a prescription drug benefit, restrict the im­
position of deductibles to within established limits, restrict the im­
position of in-network deductibles, and prohibit overall maximum 
benefit and per-illness, annual maximum benefit caps for covered 
core services.55 
Unless one of two exceptions apply, a resident’s failure to ob­
tain “minimum creditable coverage” will result in the individual’s 
loss of his or her state personal income tax exemption as well as the 
individual being charged for fifty percent of the cost of the least 
expensive plan offered through the Commonwealth Connector.56 
The first exception from the application of these penalties applies 
to individuals who the Commonwealth Connector has determined 
there is an absence of affordable coverage for.57  The second excep­
tion exempts individuals who can establish that they did not obtain 
minimum creditable coverage because of sincerely held religious 
beliefs.58 
B. Employer Mandates 
The Bill imposes three mandates on covered employers, which 
are employers that employ eleven or more full-time equivalent em­
ployees in the Commonwealth.59  The first mandate requires cov­
ered employers to make a “fair and reasonable premium 
50. Id. ch. 118H, §§ 1-5. 
51. Id. ch. 176Q, § 2(a). 
52. Id. §§ 1-4. 
53. Id. ch. 111M, § 1. 
54. Id. 
55. 956 MASS. CODE REGS. 5.03 (2008). 
56. 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 111M2.1(5)(c) (2008). 
57. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2. 
58. Id. § 3.  
59. Id. ch. 118G, § 6C; id. ch. 149, § 188(b); id. ch. 151F, § 2. 
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contribution” to their employees’ group health insurance.60  The 
second mandate requires covered employers to establish cafeteria 
plans under § 125 of the Internal Revenue Code that offer at least 
one premium-only health benefit option.61  The third mandate re­
quires covered employers to comply with statutory reporting 
requirements.62 
1. The Fair and Reasonable Contribution Requirement 
All covered employers must make a “fair and reasonable pre­
mium contribution” to their employees’ “group health plan” as de­
fined in § 5000(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.63  A covered 
employer that employs fifty or fewer full-time equivalent employ­
ees in the Commonwealth may make a “fair and reasonable pre­
mium contribution” by either offering to pay thirty-three percent of 
the premium of a group health plan offered by the employer or by 
having twenty-five percent of its employees enrolled in its group 
health plan.64  Beginning January 1, 2009, an employer who em­
ploys more than fifty full-time equivalent employees in the Com­
monwealth is only deemed to have made a “fair and reasonable 
premium contribution” when either at least seventy-five percent of 
its employees are enrolled in its group health plan or both of the 
prior two tests are met; namely, no less than twenty-five percent of 
its employees are enrolled in its plan and it offers to pay for thirty-
three percent of the plan premium.65 
Covered employers who fail to make a “fair and reasonable 
premium contribution” toward a group health plan for their em­
ployees are required to pay a surcharge to the Commonwealth Care 
Trust Fund.66  The calculation of this surcharge reflects a portion of 
the cost the Commonwealth incurs in providing state-funded care. 
At the present time, the surcharge is at the statutory maximum of 
60. Id. ch. 149, § 188. 
61. Id. ch. 151F, § 2; 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01 (2007). 
62. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 6C. 
63. Id. ch. 149, § 188(a).  Within the meaning of § 5000(b) of the Internal Reve­
nue Code, a group health plan is “a plan (including a self-insured plan) of, or contrib­
uted to by, an employer . . . or employee organization to provide health care (directly or 
otherwise) to the employees, former employees, the employer, others associated or for­
merly associated with the employer in a business relationship, or their families.”  26 
U.S.C. § 5000(b)(1) (2006). 
64. 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.03 (2009). 
65. Id. 
66. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(d). 
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$295 per year for each full-time employee,67 and the surcharge is 
not expected to fall below this statutory ceiling. 
2. The Cafeteria Plan Mandate 
Unless an employer provides health care coverage under either 
a bona fide collective bargaining agreement or through the Insur­
ance Partnership Program, covered employers are also required to 
establish cafeteria plans, within the meaning of § 125 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, that offer at least one premium-only health benefit 
option.68  While employers are free to contribute to these plans, 
and may be required to contribute to them, under the fair and rea­
sonable contribution requirement, the cafeteria plan requirement 
simply requires the establishment of a premium-only cafeteria plan 
with one or more medical care options.69 
If the cafeteria plan requirement applies to an employer and 
the employer fails to offer group health insurance to its employees 
through a cafeteria plan, the employer will be subject to the imposi­
tion of a surcharge, called the “free rider surcharge,” when certain 
triggering events occur.70  These triggering events include the em­
ployees of an employer who fails to comply with the cafeteria plan 
requirement or the dependents of these employees incurring an ag­
gregate of $50,000 in uncovered health care costs in a year and ei­
ther (A) one employee or a dependent of an employee uses free 
care more than three times in a year or (B) the aggregate of the 
67. Id. § 188(c)(10); 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.04; see also Div. of Unemploy­
ment Assistance, Executive Office of Labor & Workforce Dev., Important Notice of 
Statutory and Regulatory Changes to the Fair Share Contribution Program (2009), 
available at http://www.mass.gov/Elwd/docs/dua/business/FSC2009Instructions.pdf 
(identifying the quarterly payments for 2009 at $73.75). 
68. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151F, § 2; id. ch. 118G, § 1; 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 
17.01 (2007).  A cafeteria plan under § 125 of the Internal Revenue Code, which is also 
referred to as a Section 125 Plan, is a plan established by an employer under which 
employees can elect to receive certain benefits such as health insurance instead of cash 
compensation and through such an arrangement the employees are able to purchase the 
benefits offered through the plan with pre-tax dollars. 
69. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151F, § 2; 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01.  Employers 
that are required to establish cafeteria plans must file copies of the plan documents with 
the Commonwealth Connector.  Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., Admin­
istrative Information Bulletin 03-07 (2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/Elwd/docs/ 
dua/business/fscAdmInfoBulletin03.rtf. 
70. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 18B(a).  The free rider surcharge ranges from 
10% to 100% of the cost incurred by the Commonwealth in providing care to the em­
ployer’s employees and their dependents. Id. § 18B(b).  This surcharge varies based on 
the number of employees the employer employs and the level of state funded costs. 
114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04. 
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employer’s employees and their dependents use free care more 
than five times in a year.71 
3. Mandated Employer Reporting 
In addition to the fair and reasonable premium contribution 
requirement and the cafeteria plan requirement, covered employers 
must also comply with three statutory reporting requirements. 
The first reporting requirement obligates all covered employ­
ers to complete and sign “employer health insurance responsibility 
disclosure” forms on an annual basis.72  In completing these forms, 
employers must provide information that the Division of Health 
Care Finance and Policy will use to implement the free rider 
surcharge.73 
Employers of employees who decline employer sponsored cov­
erage must also complete and cause their employees who decline 
coverage to complete a second form called an “employee health 
insurance responsibility disclosure” form.74  These forms, which 
must be completed annually and retained by the employer for at 
least three years, require the employer to indicate whether it has 
offered to pay for employee health insurance and whether it has a 
compliant cafeteria plan.75  The employee must then indicate on the 
same form whether she has elected to receive health care coverage 
and whether she has an alternative source of coverage.76 
The third reporting requirement imposed on employers man­
dates that employers who sponsor minimum creditable coverage 
provide their employees with the 1099-HC forms that their employ­
ees will need to complete their individual state income tax 
returns.77 
71. 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04. 
72. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 6C(a). 
73. Id.; see Div. of Health Care Fin. & Policy, Executive Office of Health & 
Human Servs., Employer Health Insurance Responsibility Disclosure 2008: FSC-Ex­
empt Employers, available at http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/g/hcr/em­
ployer_hird_fsc_exempt.pdf.  This requires the employer to indicate if they have 
adopted a compliant cafeteria plan. Id.  An employer who either fails to file a health 
insurance responsibility and disclosure form or who provides falsified information on a 
filed form is subject to a fine of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000. MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 6C(b). 
74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 6C(b). 
75. Id. 
76. Id.; see Div. of Health Care Fin. & Policy, Executive Office of Health & 
Human Servs., Employee Health Insurance Responsibility Disclosure Form 2009, avail­
able at http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/g/hcr/employee_hird_2009.pdf. 
77. 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 111M2.1(8) (2008). 
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III. ERISA PREEMPTION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BILL 
In light of what is generally perceived as a national health care 
crisis, it would seem that to the extent ERISA allows, it is 
strongly in the public interest to permit states to perform their 
traditional role of serving as laboratories for experiment in con­
trolling the costs and increasing the quality of health care for all 
citizens.78 
Nonetheless, like the only pay-or-play law that has been imple­
mented before it, the Bill is likely to face an ERISA preemption 
challenge.79  While a court hearing this challenge is unlikely to hold 
that the individual mandate, cafeteria plan requirement, and report­
ing requirements are preempted, a court is likely to hold that the 
fair share contribution requirement is preempted.80 
The 1099-HC reporting requirements are imposed upon employers by the 
Massachusetts Act.  However, an employer insured under a contract with a 
Massachusetts-licensed carrier, Blue Cross, Blue Shield or an HMO, shifts the 
obligation to furnish the form 1099-HC to the carrier.  Self-insured plans and 
out-of-state employers insuring Massachusetts employees and their depen­
dents under contracts written in other states must either provide the form di­
rectly or contract with a third-party administrator or out of state carrier to 
provide the form. 
Peter Marathas, Robert Rachal & Yolanda Montgomery, Pay-or-Play State Health In­
surance Laws and ERISA Preemption, 14 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRACTICAL  GUI­
DANCE 3, 3-4 (2008), available at 14 No. 3 HR-ADV 3 (Westlaw). 
78. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 496 n.15 (D. Md. 
2006), aff’d, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). 
79. The Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act is not being included here because it 
was granted a waiver from ERISA preemption by Congress after it was held preempted 
in Standard Oil Co. of California v. Agsalud.  633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d mem., 
454 U.S. 801 (1981); see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A) (2006) (exception for Hawaii Pre­
paid Health Care Act).  Interestingly, Governor Michael Dukakis initially contem­
plated seeking such a waiver for the Massachusetts Health Security Act, but it was 
determined that Congress would be unwilling to grant a waiver.  Susan A. Goldberger, 
The Politics of Universal Access: The Massachusetts Health Security Act of 1988, 15 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 857, 873 (1990). 
80. The fair share contribution requirement is contained in a freestanding statute 
that is distinct from the other statutory provisions established by the Bill.  This will help 
to insulate the remaining provisions from being preempted upon the preemption of the 
Fair Share Contribution Requirement.  In general, ERISA only preempts state laws 
insofar as they relate to covered plans.  Even when a part of a statute is preempted, the 
remainder of a statute will be upheld so long as the preempted provision is severable 
from the additional provisions of the statute.  Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 98 
n.17 (1983); In re Laxson, 102 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).  Whether the provi­
sion is severable from the remainder of the statute is a question of state law and the 
intent of the state legislature. Id.  A separability or severance clause in a statute is 
given effect as an aid in determining the legislative intent, but a court can uphold the 
remainder of an act irrespective of the existence of such a clause.  Carter v. Carter Coal. 
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A. The Individual Mandate Should Not Be Preempted 
It is unlikely that the individual mandate established by the Bill 
would be found to “relate to” ERISA plans and, thus, be pre­
empted because the individual mandate has neither a “connection 
with” nor a “reference to” ERISA plans. 
The individual mandate requires residents of the Common­
wealth, regardless of their employment status, to obtain health care 
coverage that complies with the requirements established for “mini­
mum creditable coverage.”81  The requirement that such coverage 
be obtained is placed on individuals and not on their employers, 
should they in fact be employed.82  As a state law that applies to a 
wide variety of situations, including a large number of situations 
that have no appreciable linkage to ERISA plans, the individual 
mandate constitutes a law of general application83 in an area of 
traditional state regulation, health care.84 
Since the individual mandate is a law of general application in 
an area of traditional state regulation, there is a rebuttable pre­
sumption that Congress did not intend for ERISA to preempt it.  It 
is unlikely that a court would find this presumption rebutted and 
hold that the individual mandate has a prohibited “reference to” or 
“connection with” ERISA plans. 
It is unlikely a court would hold that the individual mandate 
has a prohibited “reference to” ERISA plans because it neither acts 
immediately and exclusively on ERISA plans nor is the existence of 
such plans essential to its operation.85  In contrast, the imposition of 
the individual mandate is dependent solely on age and residency, 
namely whether or not an individual is both a resident of the Com­
monwealth and older than eighteen years of age.  Since the factors 
underlying the individual mandate are independent of both the ex-
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1936); see, e.g., Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 
215 F.3d 526, 540 (5th Cir. 2000). 
81. See supra section II.A. 
82. 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 111M2.1(3) (2008). 
83. Pharm. Care Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 304 (1st Cir. 2005) (providing that 
“[a] state law that applies to a wide variety of situations, including an appreciable num­
ber that have no specific linkage to ERISA plans, constitutes a law of general applica­
tion” (alteration in original) (quoting Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fid. & 
Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136, 144-45 (1st Cir. 2000))); see, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA 
Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 (1997); Mackey v. Lanier Collection 
Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 838 (1988). 
84. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995). 
85. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997). 
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istence of ERISA plans and the status of an individual under an 
ERISA plan, the individual mandate cannot be said to have a “ref­
erence to” such plans.86 
The presumption that the individual mandate is not preempted 
is also unlikely to be rebutted by a court holding that it has a pro­
hibited “connection with” ERISA plans because the individual 
mandate neither directly regulates nor effectively mandates some 
element of the structure or administration of ERISA plans.87  At 
most, the individual mandate creates an indirect economic incentive 
that may affect, but does not bind, the choices of employers or their 
plans.88 
This indirect economic incentive for employers to provide cov­
erage that complies with the individual mandate is created by the 
greater value attributed to compliant coverage by employees and 
the desire of employers, in turn, to provide an employee benefit to 
which their employees attribute the greatest value.89  Employees at­
tribute greater value to compliant coverage than noncompliant cov­
erage because employees who receive noncompliant coverage must 
incur the cost of purchasing additional coverage to satisfy the mini­
mum creditable coverage requirement placed on them by the indi­
vidual mandate.  Importantly, this increased value of compliant 
coverage, while sufficient to give employers an indirect incentive 
for its provision, is insufficient to create a Hobson’s Choice for em­
ployers, whereby employers are effectively required to provide 
compliant coverage.90 
86. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656. 
87. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 192-93 (4th Cir. 2007). 
88. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658; Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d at 192-93. 
89. Employers have a desire to minimize their total labor costs by providing the 
cash and benefit combination that their employees attribute the most value to.  Sherry 
Glied & Joshua Graff Zivin, Modeling Employer Decisions to Offer Health Insurance 
12 (2004), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/no7researchabstract.pdf.  On 
average, sixty percent of an employee’s compensation is composed of wages or salary 
and the remaining forty percent is composed of benefits such as health insurance and 
retirement benefits. MICHAEL B. SNYDER, BENEFITS GUIDE § 2.1 (2008). 
90. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d at 192-93.  The court in Retail Industry 
Leaders Ass’n held that the Maryland Fair Share Act, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. 
§§ 8.5-101 to -107 (LexisNexis 2008), which provided that an employer who employed 
more than 10,000 employees in Maryland must either contribute eight percent of the 
total wages it pays to Maryland employees toward employee health care costs or pay 
the difference between its contribution and eight percent to the state, created a Hob­
son’s Choice. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d at 193.  This Hobson’s Choice effec­
tively required covered employers to pay eight percent  of their total payrolls to 
covered plans because no rational employer would pay money to the state instead of 
increasing an employee benefit. Id. 
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Like the economic incentives upheld in both Travelers91 and 
Dillingham,92 the indirect economic incentive created by the indi­
vidual mandate lacks a “connection with” or “reference to” covered 
plans because it fails to bind plan administrators to any particular 
choice, function as a regulation of an employer, or preclude uni­
form administrative practice or the provision of a uniform benefit 
package in different states.93 
B.	 The Cafeteria Plan Requirement Should Not Be Preempted by 
ERISA 
Like the individual mandate, a court would likely conclude that 
ERISA does not preempt the cafeteria plan requirement, which re­
quires covered employers to establish premium-only cafeteria 
plans.94  It is unlikely a court would hold the requirement pre­
empted because an analysis of it shows that it lacks both a “connec­
tion with” and a “reference to” covered plans. 
The cafeteria plan requirement does not have a prohibited 
“reference to” covered plans because it neither acts immediately 
and exclusively on covered plans nor are they essential to its opera­
tion.  In contrast, the cafeteria plan requirement requires the provi­
91. Travelers, 514 U.S. 645.  In Travelers, the Court examined New York’s Pro­
spective Hospital Reimbursement Methodology, which called for the cost of treatment 
at a hospital to be based on the average cost of treating a condition rather than the 
actual cost of treating it. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH  LAW § 2807(c) (McKinney Supp. 
2010).  The cost of treating the condition was based on its categorization under one of 
the 794 Diagnostic Related Groups. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 649.  Each Diagnostic Re­
lated Group was then adjusted based on each particular hospital’s operating costs. Id. 
at 649-50.  Patients with Blue Cross & Blue Shield were billed at the appropriate rate 
for the Diagnostic Related Group while other patients where surcharged up to twenty-
four percent above this level. Id. at 650. 
92.	 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 
519 U.S. 316, 316 (1997). 
In Dillingham, the Supreme Court reviewed a California law that regulated 
wages contractors paid to apprentices on public construction projects.  The law 
at issue allowed contractors to pay apprentices lower wages if they partici­
pated in state certified apprentice programs.  The Court found that by al­
lowing contractors to pay lower wages, the law created an indirect incentive 
for ERISA plans to obtain state certification.  The Court determined that the 
incentive to seek certification was not strong enough to eliminate the choice 
regarding whether to seek certification.  The Court found that the law was 
similar to the New York Statute upheld in Travelers and determined that it 
was not preempted by ERISA. 
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (citations omitted). 
93.	 See Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at 326, 329; Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-60. 
94.	 See supra section II.B. 
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sion of a noncovered benefit, namely a premium-only cafeteria plan 
that offers a group health insurance option. 
A premium-only cafeteria plan that offers a group health insur­
ance option is not a covered plan because neither a cafeteria plan, 
in and of itself, nor a premium-only group health insurance plan 
constitutes a covered plan.95  A cafeteria plan, in and of itself, is not 
an ERISA plan96 since it is a mere funding mechanism by which 
employees can utilize pre-tax dollars to obtain certain benefits, and 
the provision of tax advantaged treatment is not a benefit subject to 
ERISA.97 
Despite a cafeteria plan, in and of itself, failing to constitute a 
covered plan, the mandate that employers establish cafeteria plans 
under which employees can purchase group health insurance would 
still be preempted by ERISA if the required benefit under the em­
ployer mandated cafeteria plans is an ERISA plan.98  The critical 
analysis, therefore, is whether the benefit required by the cafeteria 
plan requirement, namely employee access to a premium-only 
group health insurance plan, constitutes an ERISA plan. 
An employer sponsored health insurance plan constitutes a 
covered plan,99 but a health insurance plan that satisfies five condi­
tions will be not be deemed to be employer sponsored and conse­
quently will not be an ERISA-covered plan.100  These five 
conditions are (1) the employer must not make any contributions to 
the plan; (2) employee participation in the plan must be voluntary; 
(3) the sole function of the employer with respect to the plan must 
be either permitting the insurer to publicize the program or collect­
ing premiums through payroll deductions; (4) the employer cannot 
receive any consideration from the insurer other than reasonable 
compensation for the administrative services the employer actually 
renders in connection with payroll deductions; and (5) the employer 
95. “Congress pre-empted state laws relating to plans [as defined in ERISA], 
rather than simply to benefits.”  Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 
(1987). 




99. See supra section I.A. 
100. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) (2009); see also Dep’t of Labor Op. Ltr. 96-12A (July 
17, 1996), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/programs/ori/advisory96/96-12a.htm; 
U.S. D.O.L. Field Assistance Bulletin 2004-1, available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/ 
fab_2004-1.html (discussing contributions to health care savings accounts) (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2010). 
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must not endorse the benefit.101  The cafeteria plan requirement 
fails to require that an employer sponsor health insurance because 
an employer can comply with the requirement without violating any 
of these five conditions. 
The fact that the cafeteria plan requirement fails to require the 
provision of a covered benefit also results in it lacking a prohibited 
connection with covered plans because employers and plan admin­
istrators can satisfy the requirement without altering their covered 
plans, and it does not otherwise interfere with the uniform nation­
wide administration of employee benefit plans.102 
C. The Reporting Requirements Should Not Be Preempted 
Like the cafeteria plan requirement, the reporting require­
ments imposed by the Bill on both employers and individuals would 
not be preempted,103 but unlike the cafeteria plan requirement, the 
reporting requirements have, at least in a technical sense, a “con­
nection with” covered plans.  Despite this connection, the reporting 
requirements are not preempted because they do not interfere with 
the uniform nationwide administration of employee benefit plans. 
The reporting requirements in the Bill requiring employers to 
report information regarding a covered benefit, group health insur­
ance,104 lack a “reference to” ERISA plans because they function 
irrespective of the existence of an ERISA plan,105 and a state law 
has a “reference to” an ERISA plan only when it acts immediately 
and exclusively on covered plans or when the existence of covered 
plans is essential to its functioning.106  While an employer spon­
101. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j); see also Dep’t of Labor Op. Ltr. 96-12A, supra note 
100.  An employer is deemed to have endorsed a benefit when the employer fails to R 
appear neutral to its employees in regard to their election to forgo receiving cash com­
pensation in exchange for their purchase of a benefit available through the plan.  An 
employer is not deemed to have endorsed a plan by merely limiting the providers that it 
allows to market products available through its cafeteria plan.  Dep’t of Labor, Inter­
pretive Bulletin Relating to Payroll Deduction IRAs, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.99-1 (2009). 
102. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1987). 
103. See supra section III.B.  A health insurance plan that “involves a fund or 
program maintained by an employer for the purpose of providing health benefits for 
[an] employee ‘through the purchase of insurance or otherwise’” is an ERISA-covered 
plan.  District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992) 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)). 
104. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of S.F., 535 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974­
76 (N.D. Cal. 2007), rev’d, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 1996). 
105. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 
519 U.S. 316, 328 (1997). 
106. Id. at 326. 
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sored health insurance plan is an ERISA-covered plan, the Bill re­
quires all covered employers to report information, irrespective of 
whether they have an employer sponsored health insurance plan. 
This statutory indifference towards the existence or inexistence of a 
covered plan results in the reporting requirement lacking a “refer­
ence to” covered plans.107 
Despite lacking a “reference to” covered plans, a statute can 
be preempted under ERISA if it fails the broader “connection 
with” test.  By requiring employers to report information to the 
Commonwealth beyond the information that must be reported in 
other states, the reporting requirements of the Bill place a burden 
on the uniform nationwide administration of employee benefit 
plans.  Due to this resulting burden, the reporting requirements 
have, at least technically, a “connection with” ERISA plans.108 
In this technical sense, the Bill’s reporting requirements have a 
“connection with” covered plans, but since the burden imposed on 
covered plans is so slight, a court would likely determine that this 
connection does not result in the reporting requirements being 
deemed to “relate to” covered plans.109  Similar to the reporting 
requirements upheld in Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders & 
Contractors, Inc. v. Foley,110 the reporting requirements established 
by the Bill require the reporting of only general and readily availa­
ble payroll information.111  The reporting of such information has a 
“connection with” covered plans, but the slight administrative bur­
den arising from reporting such information does not burden or in­
fluence the benefits or structure of employee benefit plans or 
107. Id. at 328; see Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. 
Foley, 37 F.3d 945, 956-57 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a law does not contain a prohib­
ited reference to covered plans if it is neither specifically designed to affect employee 
benefits, singles out ERISA plans for special treatment, or creates a scheme in which 
ERISA plans are so central that “the rights and restrictions [the law] creates are predi­
cated on the existence of such a plan”); see also Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 
657; WSB Elec., Inc. v. Curry, 88 F.3d 788, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1996). 
108. See supra section I.B. 
109. Burgio & Compofelice, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 
1008 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Keystone, 37 F.3d at 963; Felix A. Marino Co. v. Comm’r of 
Labor & Indus., 689 N.E.2d 495, 498 (Mass. 1998). 
110. Keystone, 37 F.3d at 958 (holding that reporting requirements established 
under the Pennsylvania prevailing wage statute that allowed employers to use the value 
of covered benefits to calculate the wages being paid fails to have a “reference to” 
covered plans). 
111. It may be posited that the burden of the Massachusetts statute is greater 
than that in Egelhoff or in Keystone because the Bill requires administrators to first 
determine if their plans meet the requirements of the individual mandate before send­
ing employees 1099-HC forms. See id. at 962. 
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otherwise interfere with the congressional goal of allowing the na­
tionwide administration of uniform employee benefit plans, and, ac­
cordingly, the reporting requirement is not preempted.112 
D. The Fair Share Contribution Requirement Is Preempted 
Whereas the individual mandate, the cafeteria plan require­
ment, and the reporting requirements are all likely to survive an 
ERISA preemption challenge, the requirement imposed on em­
ployers to make a fair and reasonable contribution to their employ­
ees’ coverage under an employer-established group health plan, as 
such plan is defined in § 5000(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, 
is likely to be held preempted by ERISA under both the “reference 
to” and “connection with” tests. 
The fair share contribution requirement fails both prongs of 
the “reference to” test.113  It has both an immediate and exclusive 
impact on covered plans, and such plans are essential to its opera­
tion.  An immediate impact on covered plans exists when a state 
statute requires employers to make contributions to ERISA 
plans.114  Group health plans, as defined in § 5000(b)(1) of the In­
ternal Revenue Code, to which employers make contributions, are 
necessarily ERISA plans.115  By mandating that covered employers 
make a specific contribution to a § 5000(b)(1) group health plan, 
112. See id.; see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2d Cir. 
1989) (“What triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administra­
tive procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit 
plans, such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a benefit and the amount of that 
benefit.”); see also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 158 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(citing De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 (1997), 
and Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 482 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1988)); 
Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 657 (holding that the administrative burden cre­
ated by requiring employers to calculate their health care expenditures for their em­
ployees fails to have a prohibited connection with covered plans); WSB Elec., Inc., 88 
F.3d at 796. 
113. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 828; see Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997). 
114. Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, 891 F.2d 25, 30 (2d Cir. 1989); Local 
Union 598, Plumbers & Pipefitters Indus. Journeyman & Apprentices Training Fund v. 
J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988). 
115. Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 11 F.3d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 1993); 
Brief for Chamber of Commerce of U.S.A. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, 
supra note 20, at 15.  The overlap of the definitions of group health plans under the R 
Internal Revenue Code and employee welfare benefit plans under ERISA is readily 
apparent.  The former defines a group health plan as “a plan (including a self insured 
plan) of, or contributed to by, an employer . . . or employee organization to provide 
health care (directly or otherwise) to the employees, former employees, the employer, 
others associated or formerly associated with the employer in a business relationship, or 
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which is necessarily an ERISA plan, the fair share contribution re­
quirement acts immediately and exclusively on covered plans. 
The fair share contribution requirement also has a prohibited 
“reference to” covered plans because covered plans are essential to 
its operation.  The fair share contribution requirement forces em­
ployers to establish and contribute to group health plans within the 
meaning of § 5000(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, which, as 
indicated above, are necessarily ERISA plans.  By requiring the es­
tablishment of and contributions to covered plans, covered plans 
are essential to the operation of the fair share contribution 
requirement.116 
Even if the fair share contribution requirement lacked a pro­
hibited reference to covered plans, it would still be preempted for 
having a “connection with” such plans because the nature of the 
effect of the state statute is to interfere with the nationwide uniform 
administration of employee benefit plans.117  This interference ex­
ists because obligating employers to make specific contributions to 
covered plans or to pay fees to the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund 
forces plan sponsors to adjust their contributions to comply with the 
levels of funding established by the fair share contribution require­
ment.118  This required level of funding impairs the nationwide uni­
form administration of employee benefit plans by preventing plan 
administrators and employers from adopting uniform nationwide 
funding schemes119 and gives rise to a prohibited connection with 
such plans.120 
their families.”  26 U.S.C. § 5000(b)(1) (2006).  The latter defines “an employee welfare 
benefit plan” as 
any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer, or 
by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or 
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its 
participants or their beneficiaries through the purchase of insurance or other­
wise, (A) medical surgical or hospital care benefits, or benefits in the event of 
sickness, accident, disability . . . benefits. 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). 
116. See Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 326; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 
133, 140 (1990); Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829; Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of 
S.F., 535 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974-76 (N.D. Cal. 2007), rev’d, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 1996). 
117. See supra section I.B. 
118. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 976. 
119. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d at 193-94. 
120. “A [state] statute which mandates employer contributions to benefit plans 
and which effectively dictates the level at which those . . . contributions must be made 
has a most direct connection with an employee benefit plan.”  Local Union 598, Plumb­
ers & Pipefitters Indus. Journeyman & Apprentices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones Constr. 
Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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It has been posited that the fair share contribution requirement 
might not be preempted by ERISA because it only relates to ER­
ISA plans at the election of employers.121  The premise of this posi­
tion is that covered employers face only a $295 per employee fee 
for noncompliance, which it is argued is substantially less than the 
cost of making a fair share contribution.  Based upon this premise, 
the proponents of this position conclude that the fair share contri­
bution requirement may be found to only constitute an economic 
incentive that neither binds plan administrators to a particular 
choice nor mandates the particular funding of a covered plan and is, 
therefore, not preempted.122 
While it is true that indirect economic incentives that merely 
provide a financial benefit to a plan if the plan makes certain 
choices lack a prohibited connection with covered plans,123 there 
are three reasons why the fee imposed by the Bill for noncompli­
ance is not the type of indirect economic incentive that falls within 
this exception.  First, the fee is not intended to constitute a financial 
incentive but is rather a fee for noncompliance.124  Second, unlike 
the options available in Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n, where an 
employer could comply with the contribution requirement by either 
providing a covered benefit or a noncovered employee benefit,125 
the fair share contribution requirement does not provide employers 
with a set of alternatives.  It mandates a specific action and charges 
a fee for noncompliance that does not go to the direct benefit of the 
employees126 but, instead, goes to the Commonwealth Care Trust 
121. See, e.g., Stiefel, supra note 48, at 699-700. R 
122. See id. 
123. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 
519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659-60 (1995); Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders 
& Contractors, Inc. v. Foley, 37 F.3d 945, 960 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
124. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(b) (2008); see Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n 
v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 495 (D. Md. 2006), aff’d, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007); 
see also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 150-51 (2001). 
125. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of S.F., 546 F.3d 639, 660-61 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
126. Id. at 655-56; see also Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664; Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n 
v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d at 1218 
(stating that a law relates to an ERISA plan if it directly or indirectly purports to regu­
late employee benefit plans by attempting in one way or another to reach the terms or 
conditions of such plans).  In Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n, the court determined that 
the two options provided by the statute resulted in a Hobson’s Choice because one 
option was impractical. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d at 197.  Neither the 
appellee nor the appellant argued, and the court did not discuss, the possibility that a 
third option existed: breach the statute and pay a $250,000 fine. See id. at 193-97; see 
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Fund.127  Third, unlike the financial incentives in Keystone,128 Trav­
elers,129 and Dillingham,130 the fee is not contained in a law of gen­
eral application that imposes an indirect burden on covered 
plans.131  It is contained in a law that imposes a direct burden on 
covered plans.132 
E. Conclusion 
ERISA preempts state laws insofar as they “relate to” ERISA 
plans.  This prohibited relationship exists if the state law has a “ref­
erence to” or “connection with” covered plans.  Under this test the 
individual mandate, cafeteria plan requirement, and reporting re­
quirements of the Bill will be upheld, while its fair share contribu­
tion requirement will be preempted. 
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE MASSACHUSETTS BILL 
A. Introduction 
Irrespective of how you look at it, the Bill is in trouble.  Its cost 
has far exceeded the cost predictions at the time of its passage,133 
also MD. CODE  ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-105(b) (LexisNexis 2008).  For employers 
with over 10,000 employees, Maryland’s $250,000 fine may be substantially less than the 
Massachusetts contribution, a $295 annual per employee surcharge.  In Massachusetts 
no second option exists; an employer either complies with the law by making a fair and 
reasonable premium contribution or pays the surcharge plus any applicable fines. See 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188. 
127. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, § 18B(e). 
128. See Keystone, 37 F.3d at 957-58 (upholding a state prevailing wage statute 
that allowed contributions to ERISA plans to be taken into account when calculating 
prevailing wage payments). 
129. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656 (upholding a state statute imposing surcharges 
on all patients covered by insurers and HMO plans other than Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield). 
130. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 328 (1997) (holding that California’s prevailing wage statute that 
allowed employees who are enrolled in apprenticeship programs to be paid a lower 
wage did not relate to covered plans despite some apprenticeship programs constituting 
covered plans). 
131. Laws of general application are state laws that apply to both covered plans 
and situations that do not involve covered plans.  These laws have been held to include 
generally applicable state garnishment statutes, Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & 
Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 841 (1988), and statutes requiring companies to make lump 
sum severance payments, Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 23 (1987). 
132. Pharm. Care Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 304 (1st Cir. 2005). 
133. When the Bill was passed the legislature predicted that $725 million would 
be needed for Commonwealth Care subsidies in the third year, but it appears $869 
million will be required.  Trudy Lieberman, Cautionary Healthcare Tales from Califor­
nia and Massachusetts, THE  NATION, Mar. 25, 2008, http://www.thenation.com/doc/ 
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and one of its central requirements, the fair share contribution re­
quirement, is subject to preemption.  Preemption of the fair share 
contribution requirement would, moreover, defeat the purposeful 
interrelation between the individual mandate and fair share contri­
bution requirement in the Bill. 
The interrelation between the individual mandate and the em­
ployer fair share contribution requirement effectively divides the 
cost of mandated coverage between employees and employers.  The 
underlying purpose for this interrelation is the belief that while 
health care coverage is an individual responsibility and necessity, 
employers should be at least partially responsible for assisting em­
ployees in procuring such coverage.134  Preemption of the employer 
fair share contribution requirement will destroy its interrelation 
with the individual mandate with the result that individuals will 
bear the entire cost of the mandated coverage.  The Common­
wealth of Massachusetts cannot confidently expect to salvage the 
Bill and its objective of dividing the cost of mandated coverage be­
tween employers and employees unless an amendment or amend­
ments implement certain changes to the Bill and the state minimum 
wage. 
There are four changes that are necessary to avoid a successful 
ERISA preemption challenge while still accomplishing the objec­
tive of having employers contribute to their employees’ mandated 
coverage.  First, an amendment should remove the employer fair 
20080407/lieberman.  There are three primary causes for this discrepancy.  First, esti­
mates at the time of the Bill’s passage placed the number of uninsureds in the Com­
monwealth at 400,000 when in fact the number was closer to 650,000. Id.  Second, it 
was expected that reductions in the number of uninsureds would reduce the costs in­
curred by the state’s free care pool by between $500 million $600 million. Id.  These 
savings have failed to materialize.  Third, the cost of health care in Massachusetts has 
continued to skyrocket at about ten percent per year. Id.; see also Alice Dembner, 
Healthcare Cost Increases Dominate Mass. Budget Debate, BOSTON  GLOBE, Mar. 26, 
2008, at A12.  The actual amount spent on free care was reduced by approximately 
forty-one percent.  Glen Johnson, State Insurance Law Result ‘Remarkable,’ WORCES­
TER  TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Aug. 20, 2008, at A-3, available at http://www. 
telegram.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080820/NEWS/808200370/1052.  The pre­
sent shortfall between the funds available for the Commonwealth Care subsidies and 
the actual cost of subsidizing the policies has been resolved through placing an addi­
tional one dollar per pack tax on cigarettes.  This tax is expected to generate $174 mil­
lion annually.  Medical News Today, Massachusetts Cigarette Tax Increases by $1 Per 
Pack to Fund State Health Insurance Law, July 4, 2008, http://www.medicalnewstoday. 
com/articles/113934.php. 
134. See State House News Service, Daily Transcript, May 4, 2006 (on file with 
Western New England Law Review) (Senator Lees’s response to question regarding 
overriding Governor Mitt Romney’s veto of section 47 of House Bill 4779). 
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share contribution requirement because it has generated a meager 
$6 million135 and, more importantly, is preempted by ERISA.136 
Second, an amendment to the state minimum wage should both in­
crease and bifurcate the minimum wage into a cash portion and a 
benefit portion, similar to a prevailing wage.  Third, an amendment 
to the Bill should implement further restrictions on employee ac­
cess to plans under the Commonwealth Care Program.  Fourth, an 
amendment strengthening the individual mandate should be passed. 
B.	 Removal of the Fair Share Contribution Requirement and 
Restructuring of Minimum Wage 
Despite ERISA preempting state efforts to force employers to 
contribute to their employees’ health care coverage, the goal of the 
fair share contribution requirement, to have employers contribute 
to their employees’ coverage, can still be accomplished through a 
more indirect means.  This indirect means would involve increasing 
the minimum wage by the amount that it is believed employers 
should contribute to their employees’ coverage and structuring the 
minimum wage to resemble a prevailing wage by dividing it into 
cash and benefit portions.137  This proposed minimum wage would 
resemble the existing New York prevailing wage138 in that employ­
ers could not satisfy the benefit portion by paying its cash 
equivalent.  As a result, all employees, irrespective of their cash 
compensation, would receive a threshold level of benefits.  To sur­
vive preemption, employers must be able to satisfy the benefit por­
tion of the wage by providing, at their election, either ERISA-
covered benefits, such as employer sponsored health care coverage, 
or benefits that fall beyond the scope of ERISA.139 
This option to provide a benefit other than a contribution to­
wards an employee’s health care coverage is necessary for the re­
vised minimum wage to survive preemption140 but could lead to the 
failure of the statute to accomplish its goal of having employers 
share in the cost of their employees’ health care coverage.  To re­
135.	 Dembner, supra note 133. R 
136.	 See supra section III.D. 
137. This could also help to address the discrepancy between the cost of providing 
care to uninsureds and the maximum employer fee of $295 per employee for covered 
employers who fail to make a fair and reasonable premium contribution to their em­
ployees’ coverage. 
138.	 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220 (McKinney 2009). 
139. Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 
1009 (2d Cir. 1997). 
140.	 Id. 
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duce the risk of failure, employers must be persuaded to satisfy the 
benefit portion of the wage with contributions towards their em­
ployees’ health care coverage, instead of providing an alternative 
noncash benefit.  This persuasion could be created by placing incen­
tives on employees to favor a contribution towards their health care 
coverage over an alternative noncash benefit because if the cost to 
an employer is the same, a rational employer will elect to provide 
the benefit to which its employees attribute the greatest value.141 
The existing individual mandate creates an incentive for em­
ployees to favor a contribution towards coverage over a different 
noncash benefit because a contribution towards coverage would re­
duce an employee’s premium, leaving more cash in the employee’s 
pocket, and, in general, employees favor additional cash compensa­
tion over additional noncash benefits.142  This preference for in­
creased cash compensation over increased benefits provides a 
canvas upon which the Commonwealth can design additional incen­
tives for employees to favor premium contributions over alternative 
noncash benefits. 
One such additional incentive could be to limit employee ac­
cess to Commonwealth Care Plans to employees who fund their 
premium contributions with payroll deductions.  By limiting em­
ployee access to these subsidized plans to employees who fund their 
contributions with payroll deductions, employees who qualify for 
the plans will elect to pay for their coverage with payroll deductions 
rather than purchasing nonsubsidized plans.  The payroll deduc­
tions will then reduce the employee’s weekly take-home pay by the 
amount of the pay period’s subsidized premium.  In order to allevi­
ate this deduction and increase the employee’s take home pay, 
which in general an employee would prefer over receiving an addi­
tional noncash benefit, the employee would pressure his employer 
to contribute towards his premium instead of providing an alternate 
noncash benefit.143 
141. See supra note 90. R 
142. See Promoting Retirement Plan Coverage Among Small Employers: Hearing 
on Pension Issues Before the Ways and Means Subcomm. on Oversight, 105th Cong. 
(1998) (testimony of Paul J. Yakobowski, Senior Research Associate, Employee Benefit 
Research Institute), available at http://www.ebri.org/publications/testimony/index.cfm? 
fa=t110. 
143. In essence, employees who receive the contribution towards their coverage 
would receive a contribution by their employer towards coverage and a subsidy from 
the Commonwealth for this coverage, thereby increasing the cash plus health insurance 
value of their paycheck. 
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To prevent an individual from failing to procure coverage and 
at the same time receiving an additional noncash benefit that the 
individual deems to be more valuable than minimum creditable 
coverage, the individual mandate should be amended.  This amend­
ment would provide that if an employee fails to procure minimum 
creditable coverage, a withholding will be taken from the em­
ployee’s paycheck in the amount of the premium for the least ex­
pensive plan offered by the Commonwealth Connector.  These 
amounts would then be turned over to the Commonwealth Connec­
tor and would be used to purchase the least expensive unsubsidized 
policy that is available for the employee.  This would result in the 
employee having to pay the equivalent of an unsubsidized premium 
when he might otherwise qualify for a subsidized one, and he would 
not be receiving employer contributions toward this premium, with 
the resulting effect that his weekly take-home pay would be re­
duced.  Again, to alleviate this reduction in take-home pay, the em­
ployee would seek to have his employer contribute to his coverage 
instead of providing the additional noncash benefit. 
C.	 Proposed Amendments and ERISA Preemption 
The proposed amendments to the state minimum wage and the 
individual mandate would not only rectify the current deficiencies 
of the Bill but would also likely survive an ERISA preemption 
challenge. 
1.	 The Proposed Amendments to the Minimum Wage 
Would Not Be Preempted 
In analyzing the restructured minimum wage, which includes a 
cash portion and a benefit portion, a court would begin with the 
presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt the state law 
because the regulation of wages is a traditional area of state regula­
tion.144  With this presumption in mind, a court would then apply 
the “reference to” and “connection with” tests. 
The ability of an employer to satisfy the benefit portion of the 
wage with either covered or noncovered benefits results in the re­
structured wage lacking a “reference to” covered plans because 
144. Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Foley, 37 F.3d 
945, 959 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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they are neither essential to its operation nor does the restructured 
wage act immediately and exclusively on them.145 
In addition to preventing the restructured minimum wage from 
containing a prohibited “reference to” covered plans, the election 
available to employers in satisfying the benefit portion of the wage 
also prevents the statute from having a prohibited “connection 
with” covered plans.  There is no prohibited “connection with” cov­
ered plans because employers and plan administrators have discre­
tion either to leave their plans intact and provide a noncovered 
benefit or alter their plans and provide a covered benefit.  This 
choice insulates the statute from interfering with the uniform na­
tionwide administration of employee benefit plans.146  This result is 
unaffected by the burden created by requiring employers to calcu­
late the per-hour value of the benefit being provided, which may be 
a covered benefit because the burden the calculation creates is ex­
tremely slight.147 
2.	 The Proposed Amendments to the Individual Mandate 
Should Not Be Preempted 
In analyzing the enhanced individual mandate, a court would 
likely break its analysis into two parts.  The first part would ex­
amine the mandates placed on individuals and the second would 
examine the mandates placed on employers.  Both parts of this 
analysis would begin with the presumption that Congress did not 
intend to preempt the state statute because the enhanced individual 
mandate is a generally applicable law in traditional areas of state 
145. Felix A. Marino Co. v. Comm’r of Labor & Indus., 689 N.E.2d 495, 498 
(Mass. 1998); see also Burgio & Campofelice, Inc., 107 F.3d at 1008-09; Keystone, 37 
F.3d at 960-62 (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)); Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 891 F.2d 25, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1989); Local Union 598, 
Plumbers & Pipefitters Indus. Journeyman & Apprentices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones 
Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1988).  The choice created by the enhanced 
individual mandate would be preempted if it created a Hobson’s Choice, which is no 
choice at all, but, unlike covered employers in Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 
which were required to provide the covered benefit or pay its cash equivalent to the 
State, employers in Massachusetts would have a real option of providing either a cov­
ered benefit or a noncovered benefit.  There would just be an employee preference for 
the benefit to be a covered benefit, a contribution to employer sponsored health insur­
ance. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 202 (4th Cir. 2007). 
146. Burgio & Campofelice, Inc., 107 F.3d at 1009. 
147. Id. at 1007; Minn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. 
Minn. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 47 F.3d 975, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1995); Keystone, 37 F.3d at 
962; see also Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of S.F., 546 F.3d 639, 645 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
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regulation, healthcare and wages,148 but after this common starting 
point, the two parts of the analysis would diverge. 
In analyzing the requirements placed on individuals, a court 
would apply the “reference to” and “connection with” tests and 
hold that the requirements survive preemption for essentially the 
same reasons the existing individual mandate would.149  The new 
requirements lack a “reference to” covered plans because the obli­
gation is placed on individuals irrespective of their status under ER­
ISA plans,150 and, consequently, the requirements do not act 
immediately and exclusively on covered plans nor is the existence 
of such plans essential to their operation. 
The requirements placed on individuals by the enhanced indi­
vidual mandate also do not have a prohibited connection with cov­
ered plans.  A prohibited connection with covered plans exists if the 
state statute mandates an element of the structure or administration 
of ERISA plans or otherwise interferes with the uniform nation­
wide administration of such plans.151  At most, the new require­
ments imposed on individuals have an indirect effect on covered 
plans by establishing a financial incentive for employers to provide 
a covered benefit.  This indirect economic incentive neither binds 
plan administrators to a particular choice nor interferes with the 
uniform nationwide administration of employee benefit plans. 
Thus, the connection between the mandates imposed on individuals 
by the enhanced individual mandate and covered plans is insuffi­
cient to result in preemption under the “connection with” test.152 
After finding that the requirements placed on individuals by 
the enhanced individual mandate survive preemption, a court 
would analyze the provisions of the enhanced individual mandate 
requiring employers to take withholdings from the paychecks of 
employees who fail to procure coverage.  The court conducting this 
inquiry would find the employer mandates also lack a prohibited 
“reference to” or “connection with” covered plans. 
A challenge to the withholding requirement under the “refer­
ence to” test would most likely be premised on an argument that 
148. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 
(1976). 
149. See supra section III.A. 
150. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 537 U.S. 141, 147 (2001); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards 
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997). 
151. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983). 
152. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-62. 
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covered plans are essential to the requirement’s operation because 
the requirement forces employers either to establish or contribute 
to covered plans.  The fundamental flaw with this argument is that 
the employer withholdings, which are turned over to the Common­
wealth Connector and used by it to purchase private insurance, fail 
to give rise to a “plan,” as that term is used in ERISA.  Conse­
quently, there is no requirement that employers establish or con­
tribute to covered plans. 
The withholding requirement fails to give rise to a plan be­
cause to create a plan, as defined in ERISA, there must be the crea­
tion of either an employee pension benefit plan or an employee 
welfare benefit plan.153  Since the withholding requirement clearly 
does not create an employee pension benefit plan, a litigant would 
premise the challenge on the existence of an employee welfare ben­
efit plan.  An employee welfare benefit plan exists when there is a 
“plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an em­
ployer . . . through the purchase of insurance or otherwise . . . [that 
provides] medical, surgical, or hospital [benefits].”154 
The first requirement for an employee welfare benefit plan is 
not satisfied by the mandated withholdings because there is no 
plan, fund, or program.  A plan, as that term is used in the defini­
tion of an employee welfare benefit plan, “comprises a set of rules 
that define the rights of a beneficiary and provide for their enforce­
ment.  Rules governing the collection of premiums, definition of 
benefits, submission of claims, and resolution of disagreements over 
entitlement to services are the sorts of provisions that constitute a 
plan.”155  A plan, fund, or program does not exist when, as with the 
withholding requirement, an employer pays amounts out of its gen­
eral assets on a regular basis and the employer’s corresponding ad­
ministrative duties in calculating and paying such amounts are so 
ministerial that the abuses Congress was concerned with when it 
passed ERISA are absent.156 
The ministerial nature of the duties created by the withholding 
requirement is evidenced by the requirement imposing no greater 
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2006). 
154. Id. § 1002(1); Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of S.F., 546 F.3d 
639, 653 (9th Cir. 2008); Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 12 F.3d 1498, 1501-02 (9th Cir. 
1993). 
155. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 222-23 (2000); see also Massachusetts v. 
Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115-16 (1989) (holding that vacation benefits package that an 
employer pays out of its general assets, like wages, rather than out of a separate fund, 
fails to constitute a plan). 
156. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 650-53. 
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burden on employers than the burden imposed by the multitude of 
other required withholdings in existence, such as state and federal 
income and employment tax withholdings. 
Even if a plan is found to exist, this plan would not be an em­
ployee welfare benefit plan.  The second requirement for an em­
ployee welfare benefit plan is that the plan provide “medical, 
surgical, or hospital [benefits]” to its participants “through the 
purchase of insurance or otherwise.”157  This requirement would 
not be met because employers are not providing a benefit through 
the purchase of insurance or otherwise.  Instead, they are making 
mandated contributions to a state entity that the state entity uses to 
purchase private insurance.  The position that employers are not 
providing the benefit through the purchase of insurance or other­
wise is evidenced by the fact that both the Commonwealth Connec­
tor and the policies offered by the private insurers through the 
Connector would exist irrespective of whether employers make 
payments to the Connector because employees would be required 
to purchase the coverage.158 
Despite the withholding requirement lacking a “reference to” 
covered plans, it could still be preempted under the broader “con­
nection with” test, which examines whether or not the challenged 
statute interferes with the uniform nationwide administration of 
employee benefit plans.  In contrast to statutes that bind plan ad­
ministrators to particular choices159 or force covered plans to pro­
vide certain benefits,160 the withholding requirement fails to force 
employers to alter their existing plans either directly or by creating 
a Hobson’s Choice, and it thus fails to contain a prohibited “con­
nection with” covered plans.161 
CONCLUSION 
One of the most serious problems facing the nation is decreas­
ing access to health care.  This decreasing access is caused by a mul­
titude of factors including the spiraling cost of care, the increasing 
cost of insurance, and a reduction in employer sponsored coverage. 
Historically, political forces have prevented the implementation of 
157. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). 
158. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 653. 
159. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001). 
160. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 696 (N.D. Cal. 
1977), aff’d, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981). 
161. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659-60 (1995); Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 656. 
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the fundamental changes at the federal level that must be made, but 
states have not ignored the cries of their residents and have at­
tempted to enact measures to increase access to care.  The Massa­
chusetts Bill is one of these measures, and it attempts to address a 
problem that has led to a reduction in access to care—the decrease 
in employer sponsored coverage. 
While the Massachusetts Bill has advanced the process towards 
creating a solution to the health care crisis, like many initial legisla­
tive efforts towards socioeconomic reform, it is flawed.  Besides 
costs exceeding expectations, one of its key elements, the fair share 
contribution requirement, is subject to being preempted by ERISA, 
a federal statute that was ironically intended to further the provi­
sion of employee benefits.  “Still . . . the unraveling of [the Bill] will 
not signal the end to the story of universal health in Massachusetts. 
The same pressures that created the conditions for passage of the 
current law will continue to exert their effect until a more durable 
solution is found.”162  As the pressures for a more durable solution 
continue to grow, examination of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Bill and of proposed legislative redress are the necessary build­
ing blocks towards devising a durable solution. 
162. Goldberger, supra note 79, at 859 (discussing the Massachusetts Health Se- R 
curity Act of 1988, which was intended to establish universal coverage for residents of 
the Commonwealth but was repealed under economic circumstances that mirror those 
the Commonwealth currently faces). 
